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MS. FREEDMAN: Our collaboration as a lawyer and an epidemiologist has been, at its essence, interdisciplinary. In that sense, I would
agree with Jonathan Mann who, at the Harvard Health and Human
Rights Conference, commented that it is sometimes, or perhaps
always, harder to talk across disciplines than across cultures. In fact,
as a lawyer and an epidemiologist, we may not coexist in total
harmony, to use Elizabeth's words, but we do work together with a
kind of creative tension. Indeed, that is why we called this talk
"Facing Facts," because our exchange is often a process in which each
of us is forced to face the facts exposed by the other's discipline.
Sometimes this results in a contentious and frustrating kind of
exchange, in which one of us urges the other to just "get real" about
what is going on in the world. Luckily, in the end, we always end up
having lunch together again and talking more and working more,
because, in fact, in the end, both of us-as a lawyer, as an epidemiologist, as women-care very deeply about the very same things-about
the lives of women, their well-being, and working towards a world in
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which women can live with health and dignity as full and equal
human beings.
We think our collaboration is, in fact, indicative of some broader
trends within our movements over the last five to ten years. These
two movements, the women's human rights movement and the
women's health movement, have been moving along parallel tracks
with some occasional cross over. When I say "parallel tracks," I do not
mean simply in the kind of visual geometric sense of railroad tracks
in which the two sort of move separately without connecting. There
has been a parallel movement in the substantive sense.
Both movements are working towards rejecting a view of the world
that sees each person as an individual, solitary self armed with rights,
who has a body that gets sick or gets well, who is detached from the
world in which he or she lives, and who functions in opposition to
collectivities. Both movements are embarked on a process of
constructing and understanding a connected self, both socially and
literally physically-what some of my colleagues like Rosalind
Petchesky and Rhonda Copelon have called an integrative principle
that works in both fields.
In the women's human rights movement, what we have seen in the
last five years, through the Vienna process (the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights) and the Cairo process (the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development), is the effort to go
beyond civil and political rights, indeed, to go beyond the first layer
of analysis in which we really focused on violence against women and
showed how the traditional human rights field had missed women's
experience of violation (even violations that were "classic" human
rights violations, such as violations against the physical body by agents
of the State). Es'ecially with Cairo, the women's human rights
movement is now expanding and deepening its analysis, and women's
health, especially reproductive health, is an important theme around
which that is happening. The women's human rights movement in
this field, for example, is working hard on questions of the indivisibility of civil and political rights on the one hand and economic, social,
and cultural rights on the other hand.
Just to give an example in practical terms, we see that reproductive
rights cannot be understood simply as free choice in a vacuum. After
all, it does not mean a lot to have a theoretical right to contraceptives, if there are no contraceptives. Moreover, a theoretical right
to contraception means nothing if, in reality, your family or your
husband have the power to prevent you from exercising that right.
The human rights movement, therefore, is moving towards this type
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of analysis that sees the interconnection among different kinds of
rights.
At the same time, we see parallel movement in the health field.
Early work in the health field focused on health as biological
processes, the biological processes by which we define health and
disease. In this context, two decades ago and longer ago than that,
women's health was largely a concern of the child survival movement.
In other words, the reason we needed to have healthy women was
because we needed to have healthy mothers in order to have healthy
children. This was the approach to women's health, and maybe some
of the measures taken in the health field did improve women's
physical health but did little, perhaps, for their strategic interests.
This approach began to change around 1985 when the health field
began to give increasing attention to women's health, for its own sake.
For example, in that year, my colleague, Deborah Maine, together
with Allan Rosenfield, looked at what is called the maternal child
health field (MCH Field), and asked in an article they wrote in The
Lancet, the very simple question: "Where is the 'M' in MCH?" In the
last decade or so, we have seen the development of the reproductive
health movement in which people like Dr. Fathalla have really been
so central in defining what the term "reproductive health" means.
With the growth of the reproductive health movement, we see two
broad trends in the health field, which are reflected, for example, in
the Cairo Document. First, women's health is important in its own
right, because women are not just mothers of children, but they are
important, valuable members of society in their own right. Second,
women's health cannotjust be understood as biological processes, but
we have to see biology as embedded in, and deeply influenced by,
social, economic, and political conditions that affect everyone's
everyday life in societies around the world and at all levels-family,
community, and state.
In sum, both of these movements-the women's human rights
movement and the women's health movement-are working at
expanding the context and seeing connections. It is important that
we maintain these trends, but-and here is where our collaboration
comes in-we should also see warning lights. We should hear bells
ringing warning to us, because one of the things that has happened
is that we have identified so many connections and so much complexity that we are, indeed, in danger of losing our way.
Both fields have become so complex and so interconnected that we
simply don't know where to start. We look at every health condition
and try to determine whether it is caused by lack of education,
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poverty, women not being able to generate income, not being able to
control income, lack of services, bad laws, lack of law reform, or lack
of good courts. We can point to a zillion things which could be the
cause of the situation but have little idea how to prioritize among
them, how to determine what factors are most influential, and most
importantly, where, strategically, as activists, we should start. This is
one of the senses in which I think we are in danger of losing our way.
The second sense is one that Deborah and I spend most of our
lunch hours talking about. We are worried that human rights people,
perhaps because of the complexity that exists at an international level,
are beginning to use facts very loosely. Perhaps the best example of
this is one of the most contentious, and that is contraception. You
will regularly hear people who are not in the health field saying that
particular contraceptives are dangerous, or have never been tested on
different populations. Very often, these statements are simply
detached from the real facts of how the contraceptives are tested. It
might not be the ideal kind or highest quality of scientific testing, but
in international law discourse we are not attuned to real facts. This
loose use of facts may be fine for organizing. In fact, I think we have
done very well developing a movement. But, if you don't have your
facts right or you don't respect the facts you will not be taken
seriously by the people who have the power to initiate changes in
these different fields.
Moreover, this loose and undisciplined approach does not work for
getting things done, for deciding where do we go from here. I don't
want to blame just the rights people for this, because, indeed, I think
if we look around, we see that the health people or the health policy
people have also been playing fast and loose with the rights language.
In fact, we in the women's human rights and women's health fields
have been so successful that it seems everybody is talking about rights,
and what used to be called "family planning" is now routinely called
"reproductive health."
I think, indeed, many of our adversaries are endlessly creative.
Some of you might have seen the little, tiny article in The New York
Times about the Vatican's "revolutionary" document on Beijing, in
which the Vatican came out and said we ought to start paying women
for the housework they do. Then, of course, the Vatican goes on to
observe that women should stay home and take care of their children,
because that is their rightful place. I think we have to be really alert
to the endlessly creative ways in which our own language gets used.
Deborah and I spend a lot of time worrying together about this
kind of looseness, and therefore, we decided to call our collaboration
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"Facing Facts" because we need to face each other's facts. The facts
do not always show what we want them to show, or indeed what we
expect them to show.
Just as there is a trend of seeing rights not just as individual cases
of abuse but as embedded in broader structural systems of injustice,
we also need to see health, not just as individual cases of disease,
which is really the work of medicine. Rather, as we are looking at
rights structurally, we need to look at health structurally. We need to
look at, not so much the field of medicine, but rather the field of
public health, the health of populations. The primary analytic tool of
public health is epidemiology. In this short presentation, Deborah
and I want to take one very big problem in the field of epidemiology
and in the field of women's human rights-maternal mortality-and
show you what we think it means to be facing each others' facts.
MS. MAINE: Epidemiologists may feel that reproductive fights
advocates speak in grand generalities and do not pay enough
attention to facts. Furthermore, these two disciplines do not always
even speak the same language, as, for example, when Lynn and I
talked about implementation. For Lynn, implementation means
going from law to policy. For me, implementation means going from
policy to programs.
Despite its difficulties, collaboration is imperative, especially now
when policies are being developed. The work we have embarked
upon-by "we," I mean all of us here-is too important to risk failure.
Failure can mean having a policy that does not actually benefit
women in the world. This kind of failure is not a remote possibility.
It could happen if policies and programs are based just on common
sense or on widely accepted ideas, because common sense can be
misleading and widely accepted ideas are sometimes wrong.
An excellent example is, as Lynn said, maternal mortality. Maternal
mortality is the death of women due to complications of pregnancy.
This includes complications of abortion. The death can take place
before delivery, during delivery, or after delivery, up to about forty-two
days, but must be directly due to pregnancy or some medical
condition that was aggravated by pregnancy.
Deaths from complications of pregnancy are extremely rare now in
developed countries. But in less developed countries, obstetric
complications are still the leading cause of premature death among
women. The situation is best expressed through a statistic called the
lifetime risk, which is the average cumulative likelihood that a woman
will die of a maternal cause. This reflects both the risk associated
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with each pregnancy and the number of times the woman gets
pregnant. A person cannot accumulate infant mortality risk because
you are only an infant once. But a woman accumulates the risk of
maternal death every time she gets pregnant.
The lifetime risk of maternal death in Africa today is 1 out of 23
women. It is a risk much higher than AIDS in most places except for
perhaps central Harlem. In Asia, the risk is 1 in 54 and in Latin
America, 1 in 73. By comparison, in Northern Europe, the risk is 1
out of almost 10,000 women. One in 23 versus 1 in 10,000. That is
a tremendous difference.
We are accustomed to seeing data showing large differentials in
health conditions between developed and developing countries,
though with maternal mortality this difference is much bigger than,
for example, with infant mortality. Furthermore, we assume, rightly,
that elements of the development process are responsible for these
differentials. But which elements? This is the concept that Lynn was
talking about when she was discussing setting priorities.
Some people maintain that education is a key element in maternal
mortality. After all, many studies have shown that the higher the level
of education, the lower the level of maternal mortality. This is true
both between countries and within countries. Thus, there is a
correlation between maternal mortality and education; they vary
together. A correlation, however, is not the same thing as a causal
relationship. Just because two statistics vary together does not mean
that one causes the other. In fact, on closer inspection, maternal
mortality and education are not causally related.
Consider, for example, the history of maternal mortality in now
developed countries. In Britain, from 1840 to 1930, that is 90 years,
there was no decline in maternal mortality. During this time, infant
mortality declined steadily, due to improved nutrition, improved
education, improved sanitation, and improvement in the standard of
living--in other words, what we call "development."
During this whole time, however, maternal mortality did not decline
at all. Why? Moreover, why did it start to decline in the mid-1930s?
Maternal mortality at that point dropped sharply, and by 1950 was not
a major problem anymore in the West. Starting in the mid-1930s,
specific treatments were developed that could save the lives of women
who had serious complications-chiefly, antibiotics for infection and
blood transfusion for women with hemorrhage.
In trying to understand what will reduce maternal mortality, in
addition to international comparisons over time, we can look for
international evidence at particular points in time. For example,
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education was almost universal in what are now-developed countries,
well before maternal mortality began to decrease. In 1915, when
maternal mortality was still over 600 deaths per 100,000 live births,
more than ninety percent of women in this country were already
literate. This is compared to less than 8 deaths per 100,000 live births
in the United States today. What kind of a threshold of education,
therefore, are we recommending to developing countries?
The point is that education is important for lots of reasons,
including lots of human rights reasons, but it is not going to reduce
maternal mortality in developing countries. This is one example,
moreover, of how it would be possible to win our policy goals, and yet
not achieve our health goals.
There are many other examples of this, and some of them
challenge cherished beliefs. The scientific literature, for example,
does not support the faith in prenatal care that people have in this
country.
We must, therefore, be careful not to bend the facts to suit our
beliefs or to disregard the facts. It is often said, for example, that
female genital mutilation kills many women during childbirth.
Experts, such as Dr. Nahid Toubia, assure me that this is not the case.
Actually, when you look at the literature, there is not the kind of
variation over geographic regions that you would expect to find if
female genital mutilation were a chief cause of maternal mortality.
Female genital mutilation is, in my opinion, and in the opinions of
lots of people who know better, a serious problem, but we cannot
justify attacking it on the basis of maternal mortality. Moreover, if we
did justify discouraging female genital mutilation on the basis of
maternal mortality, we might promote the wrong programs. If female
genital mutilation is a medical problem, maybe there is a medical and
not a social solution such as doing safer circumcisions and making
sure that women deliver in hospitals so that they can be properly sewn
up again. I do not think that this is what we had in mind. But that
is an example of how, if you have your facts wrong, not only may your
program be useless, but you may actually head in entirely the wrong
direction and end up someplace you did not want to be.
We must also be careful not to let our own values cloud our
judgment and our evaluation of facts. Caesarean section, for
example, is a greatly abused medical procedure here and in many
countries, including some developing countries, such as Brazil. This
is a serious problem from both a human rights point of view and from
a medical point of view, because all surgery is dangerous. On the
other hand, we must not forget that probably lack of access to
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caesarean section for women who have obstructed labor is one of the
key causes of maternal deaths in developing countries. Now, we can
fight overuse of caesarean section here, but we must remember that
lack of access to this procedure is a major cause of suffering and
death for women in developing countries. We have to keep our own
values from coloring our understanding of other people's situations.
On the positive side, collaboration offers exciting possibilities. For
example, there is a -lot of important work to be done in what I think
of as "feminist epidemiology." Feminist epidemiology doesn't mean
that you necessarily even gather new data. Because how you ask a
question expresses your values and shapes the meaning of your
answer. Consider the following example:
People who are interested in family planning for the reduction of
maternal mortality (which is a completely legitimate goal) have
wondered how much maternal mortality would be reduced if no
women over thirty-five (when the risks start to go up) had babies.
Some women over thirty-five, however, have very good reasons to have
babies. With existing data, it is possible to ask the same question in
a different way. What if women who say they want no more children
had no more children; what would be the effect on maternal
mortality? You are still looking at the effect of family planning but
from a feminist point of view.
In conclusion, collaboration between human rights advocates and
public health scientists can benefit both fields. There is, however, a
lot of work to be done.

